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Chapter I: General Introduction 
 
I. General Introduction 
Agricultural production creates negative externalities on a global scale, e.g., deforestation, 
loss in biodiversity, loss of cropland or carbon induced climate change (Tilman et al., 2001; 
Kitzes et al., 2008; Kastner et al., 2012; Garnett et al., 2013). From 1980 to 2000, over 80% 
of newly established agricultural land was developed on former tropical rainforest ground. 
However, since the world population is expected to grow from approximately 7.2 billion in 
2014 to more than 9.5 billion people by 2050 (FAOSTAT, 2015), a highly dynamic 
development in agricultural production is demanded. This development might further 
increase negative externalities and environmental problems (Garnett et al., 2013). 
Palm oil is an example of an especially dynamic development in agricultural production. 
This oil is widely-used around the world and can be found in a variety of products such as 
food, cosmetics or as biofuel. However, it is most commonly used globally as vegetable oil, 
with 50 million tons being produced in 2012 (FAOSTAT, 2013). Currently, Indonesia is the 
largest palm oil producer in the world. Starting in the 1960s at a relative moderate level, 
palm oil production in Indonesia has developed remarkably, with a goal of further 
increasing its production from 23.6 million tons in 2012 to 40 million tons by 2020 
(UNCTAD, 2013). Within Indonesia, the Jambi province, on the island of Sumatra, has 
experienced especially dynamic development in palm oil production (Laumonier et al., 
2010; Wilcove and Koh, 2010), which was primarily driven by private sector companies and 
small scale farmers (Zen et al., 2006). 
The tremendous development in oil palm cultivation carries drastic consequences for the 
environment. Thus, the industry’s expansion leads to high rates of deforestation, habitat 
fragmentation and losses in biodiversity (Koh and Wilcove, 2008, Margono et al., 2014). 
Moreover, due to the emission of greenhouse gases, such as C02, there are negative 
consequences for the atmosphere (Reijnders and Huijbregts, 2008). The exaggerate use of 
fertiliser in palm oil cultivation causes negative externalities. In this context, Sekhon (1995) 
shows that an exaggerated use of N-fertiliser leads to more polluted ground water in 
developing countries, specifically those located in the humid tropics. Moreover, fertiliser use 
in humid tropical climates can cause NOx and other greenhouse gas emissions (Keller and 
Matson, 1994; Veldkamp and Keller, 1997; Palm et al., 2002; Veldkamp et al., 2008). 
Additionally, fertiliser can cause ground-level ozone in oil palm plantations at 
concentrations which are detrimental to human health (Hewitt et al., 2009). These 
1 
Chapter I: General Introduction 
 
environmental problems, especially with regard to the overuse of fertiliser, demand 
effective, sustainable and efficient policy measures. 
In Jambi province, rubber is the a major crop trees and together with oil palm it generate the 
majority of farmers’ income. About the half of the cultivated land is used for rubber 
production, which usually is managed by small-scale farmers (Statistical Year Book of Estate 
Crops, 2012). Therefore, it is the logical alternative to the problematic oil palm cultivation 
and demands for investigations. Based on the economic relevance of rubber, income risk 
caused through output risk in rubber production is a crucial concern in this region. 
However, it is long proven that production inputs have an influence on output risk (Just and 
Pope, 1978, 1979). Nevertheless, for rubber production there is little knowledge about how 
production inputs influence output risk. 
This dissertation consists of two papers: The first paper is focused on an ex ante evaluation 
of policy measures for fertiliser reduction for small scale oil palm farmers in Indonesia. The 
second paper evaluates inputs’ influence on output risk for rubber cultivation and the 
external validity of experimentally measured risk attitudes for rubber farmers. Both articles 
are conducted almost with the same farmers. In the following sections, the problem 
statement and the objectives of these two papers are briefly discussed. 
1. Ex ante evaluation of policy measures 
The overuse of fertiliser, especially in oil palm cultivation, demands for an appropriate 
policy measure. It is advisable to test policy measures before they are introduced; a low cost 
opportunity for doing is through ex ante tests. For such tests, the often used rational choice 
approach has recently been challenged through new economic insight; thus, an alternative 
approach is demanded (Veetil, 2011). A promising alternative for evaluating policy 
measures, especially in developing countries, is by conducting economic experiments 
(Viceisza, 2012). Therefore, we apply a business simulation game, embedded in a framed 
field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). For such experiments however, it is essential 
that the external validity, i.e., results from the laboratory, can be extrapolated to the world 
beyond. The discussion surrounding external validity varies widely in the literature (Levitt 
and, List 2007; Camerer, 2011). In any case, further examples which contribute to this 
discussion about the external validity of experimentally gained results are desired. 
An incentive designs for policy measures can differ in several ways. Balliet et al. (2011) 
discuss a number of possible differences, primarily whether a reward for desired or a 
2 
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punishment for undesired behaviour is more successful. Other differentiations include the 
probability of occurrence for a reward or a punishment when a specific behaviour is desired 
or undesired, respectively, or the reaction towards different magnitudes of an incentive. By 
combining an incentives’ probability with its’ magnitude, the effect on the expected income 
of such an incentive can be determined (Becker, 1974). Balliet et al. (2011) lists further 
possibilities to differentiate incentive designs, e.g., the costs for giving an incentive, 
centralised vs. decentralised source of incentive, the number of iterations, the type of 
dilemma or the cost-to-fine ratio. Additionally, Sutter et al. (2010) distinguish whether 
incentives are chosen by participants compared to externally determined incentive 
mechanisms. In our article, however, we investigate in analysing reward and punishment 
with different probabilities. 
In theory, a perfectly rational, profit maximising agent will act independently of differences 
in incentive design as long as the effect on expected income is constant (Becker, 1974). 
However, the assumption of a perfectly rational, profit maximising agent has been 
challenged in recent years (Veetil, 2011). For comparing reward and punishment incentives, 
which is comparable to receiving gains and losses, there is extensive literature which 
discusses the differences in participants’ reactions. Kahneman (2011) provides several 
examples from various contexts which show that people are generally more motivated to 
avoid losses than to gain profits, e.g., for cab drivers in New York (Camerer et al., 1997), for 
messenger services in Switzerland (Fehr and Goette, 2007) or for international professional 
golf players (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). Moreover, Heath et al. (1999) found that, with the 
condition that there is a reference point, people are more motivated to avoid losses than to 
gain profits. According to these articles, punishment is expected to create stronger reactions 
than reward. In contrast, a meta-analysis including 187 effect sizes from Balliet et al. (2011) 
indicates that reward and punishment have similar positive effects on cooperation. 
Therefore, despite strong evidence for loss aversion, it remains unclear if there is also a 
stronger reactions, i.e., a higher effectiveness, towards punishment compared to reward. 
The literature also discusses the effects of gains and losses occurring with different 
probabilities. With respect to losses, Kahneman (2011) states that a low probability of 
occurrence leads to risk-avoiding behaviour. Therefore, this would imply that participants 
react more strongly towards uncertain punishment compared to a certain punishment, 
holding constant the effects on expected income. Additional research by Block and Vernon 
(1995) and Anderson and Stafford (2003) strengthen this expectation. The literature 
comparing certain and uncertain gains is limited. However, Kahneman (2011) claims risk-
3 
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seeking behaviour for gains with a low probability. This allows us to anticipate that 
participants react more strongly towards an uncertain than towards a certain reward, 
assuming constant effects on expected income. Volpp et al. (2008) present a study which 
compares certain and uncertain reward, but were unable to find a significant difference 
between the two. 
The effects of differently designed incentives on sustainability and efficiency are also 
discussed in the literature. With regard to sustainability, Anderson and Stafford (2003) 
found a negative effect through punishment in a repeated public good game. Balliet et al. 
(2011) found that incentives increase cooperative behaviour in iterated experiments, but it 
cannot be determined whether this effect is stronger for reward or for punishment. For 
efficiency, a positive effect through punishment is found in several studies (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008; Balliet et al., 2011). Moreover, it is shown that reward is 
more efficient than punishment (Sefton et al., 2007; Rand et al., 2009). However, little is 
known in regards to how sustainability and efficiency are influenced by the incentives’ 
probabilities of occurrence. 
Ex ante tests are a good opportunity for testing policy measures in advance at low costs. 
Thus far, most ex ante policy evaluations are based on the rational choice approach, which 
has recently been challenged in the field of behavioural economics. Thus, alternative 
approaches are necessary (Veetil, 2011). A promising alternative for evaluating policy 
recommendations, especially in developing countries, is by conducting economic 
experiments (Viceisza, 2012). 
The first article of this dissertation is titled “Ex ante evaluation of policy measures: Effects of 
reward and punishment for fertiliser reduction in palm oil production”. In this article, 
differently designed policy measures intended to reduce the use of fertiliser are tested ex 
ante with small scale oil palm farmers in Indonesia. To be more precise, we test if incentives 
with constant effects on expected income, but designed as being obtained through either 
reward or punishment with different probabilities to occur, cause different reactions from 
the participating farmers. The hypotheses of the aforementioned article are “For the same 
effect on expected income, the H1: effectiveness, H2: sustainability, H3: efficiency of an 
incentive is independent of its design, i.e., reward or punishment, with different magnitudes 
and probabilities of occurrence”. 
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2. Comparing the use of risk-influencing production inputs and 
experimentally measured risk attitude 
Output risk and risk attitude are among the major drivers for production decisions in 
agriculture. Thus, it is not surprising that analysing risk and risk attitude is a primary focus 
in the research pertaining to agriculture (Chavas et al., 2010). In this context, Hellerstein et 
al. (2013) discuss the importance of understanding the risk attitude/production decision 
relationship since it helps policy makers, as well as farmers to accommodate to changing 
economic and environmental circumstances. 
It is not easy to determine how risk and risk attitude affects farmers’ production decisions. 
(Just, 2001; Just and Pope, 2003). However, risk attitude has been experimentally measured 
long since (Binswanger, 1980). Moreover, Holt and Laury (2002) also described a well-
accepted method to experimentally measure the risk attitude (Anderson and Mellor, 2008). 
Ihli and Musshoff (2013) further adapted the Holt-Laury (HL) method to measure the risk 
attitude so that it can be applied to people with limited formal education. By accounting for 
this adaptation, the HL method can be applied for measuring the risk attitude in rural areas 
of developing countries. 
For this research, we focus on output risk, i.e., output variance, to evaluate farmers’ 
behaviour towards risk. Farmers’ production decisions, e.g., through input use, have a 
crucial influence on output risk, and thus, also on farmers’ income risk. Since income risks 
represent a major concern in farmers’ lives, decisions related to the use of risk-influencing 
inputs are a good option for measuring farmers’ behaviour towards risk in the field. Just and 
Pope (1978; 1979) describe a method to simultaneously estimate production inputs’ 
influence on output level, as well as output risk in agricultural production. Several studies 
have applied and further extended this approach to fit various contexts, thus proving its 
relevance (Chavas and Holt, 1996; Bar-Shira et al., 1997; Kumbhakar, 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 
Abdulkadri, 2003; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Kumbhakar and Tveterås, 2003; Barrett et al., 
2004; Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Gardebroek et al., 2010; Tiedemann and Latacz-Lohmann, 
2013). 
The external validity of experimentally gathered results, what is denoted as “insights gained 
in the lab can be extrapolated to the world beyond” (Levitt and List, 2007: 153), is 
controversially discussed. On the one hand, some economists argue against the external 
validity of experiments; in this context, Levitt and List (2007) state that the systematic 
difference from the lab to most naturally occurring environments is hindering external 
5 
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validity of the results. On the other hand, Camerer (2011) states that all empirical studies 
help to understand the general way in which individual characteristics, incentives, rules and 
endowments influence economic behaviour. Camerer argues in favour of the external 
validity of results from lab experiments and states that, with sufficient information, one 
could account for the differences between the lab and the field. In other words, this means 
that a Lab dummy variable would not be significant in a regression with a sufficient data set 
including lab and non-lab information. Furthermore, Roe and Just (2009) argue that there is 
a trade-off between internal validity, i.e., that observed correlations are causal, and the 
external validity of experiments.  
Many investigations comparing field decisions towards risk and experimentally measured 
risk attitude have already been concluded. Engle-Warnick et al. (2007) obtained 
experimental results that have helped to predict crop diversification for farmers in Peru. 
Moreover, Hill (2009) explain the production behaviour with the stated risk attitude for 
coffee producers in Uganda, whereas Barham et al. (2014) found only a small effect from 
risk aversion on the adoption of genetically modified plants. With respect to non-
agricultural decisions, Anderson and Mellor (2009) also found an expected relationship 
between experimentally measured risk attitude and decisions towards health and safety. 
Contrarily, Hellerstein et al. (2013) found unexpected results between field and 
experimental decisions. In their example, farmers with a higher risk aversion in the 
experiment have less diversified operation and less crop insurances. More examples which 
compare the internal and external validity of experimentally obtained results are certainly 
desirable. However, experimentally obtained results pertaining to risk attitude and 
production decisions towards risk, as evaluated with a Just-Pope (JP) production function, 
have not been previously compared. Influencing output risk with production inputs is a tool 
which practically every farmer can utilize. Thus, it is especially relevant because it enables 
farmers to manage their risk independently of their availability to hold insurance, have 
production diversification, obtain non-farm labour or utilize other tools. 
The second article of this dissertation is “Comparing the use of risk-influencing production 
inputs and experimentally measured risk attitude: Do decisions of Indonesian small-scale 
rubber farmers match?”. In this article, the use of risk-influencing production inputs and the 
experimentally measured risk attitude are compared in the case of small-scale rubber 
farmers in Indonesia. The hypotheses which are tested in the aforementioned article are 
“H1: The amount of used production inputs has an influence on output risk” and “H2: More 
risk-averse farmers use more risk-reducing and less risk-increasing inputs”. 
6 
Chapter I: General Introduction 
 
3. Research relevance and outline of the dissertation 
The studies presented in this dissertation are embedded in the Collaborative Research 
Centre 990 (CRC 990) under the title “Ecological and Socioeconomic Functions of Tropical 
Lowland Rainforest Transformation Systems”. The present research project is funded by the 
German Research Foundation (DFG) and is conducted in the Jambi province on the 
Indonesian Island of Sumatra. The project is an interdisciplinary and international research 
cooperation where social and natural scientists from German and Indonesian universities 
work together. The general objective of this project is to provide knowledge-based 
guidelines to protect ecological functions of tropical forests and their transformation 
systems, while human welfare is improved. Several phases are planned for the CRC 990, and 
since we are part of the first phase, our results and conclusions can also be seen as a basis 
for continuing with this research. 
The dissertation is structured as follows: In Chapter II, the article titled “Ex ante evaluation 
of policy measures: Effects of reward and punishment for fertiliser reduction in palm oil 
production” is presented. This article has been accepted by the “Journal of Agricultural 
Economics”. The focus of this article is ex ante testing experiment for policy measures aimed 
at reducing the use of fertiliser in palm oil production. Chapter III presents the article 
“Comparing the use of risk-influencing production inputs and experimentally measured risk 
attitude: Do decisions of Indonesian small-scale rubber farmers match?”. A previous version of 
this article has been published in the “EFForTS Discussion Paper Series No. 14”. This article 
compares decisions towards risk in rubber production with experimentally measured risk 
attitude. Finally, Chapter IV includes a summary of the research, as well as a conclusion for 
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Palm oil production creates negative externalities, e.g., through intensive fertiliser 
application. Policies to limit externalities need an effective, sustainable and efficient 
measure We use a business simulation game in a framed field experiment in Indonesia to 
test ex ante different incentives for reducing such negative externalities. This setting allows 
inclusion of adequate contextual features, required for reasonable ex ante evaluation of 
policy measures. The different designs of the test incentives (either a reward or 
punishment) varied in their magnitude and probability of occurrence but with constant 
effects on expected income. Results show that participants react differently to these 
incentives, indicating that the design can contribute significantly to effectiveness, 
sustainability or efficiency. A high reward with a low probability was found to be the most 
effective and sustainable incentive. Moreover, for the most efficient design, a low and certain 
reward is indicated. 
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Abstract 
This article compares the use of risk-increasing and risk-reducing production inputs with 
the experimentally measured risk attitudes of farmers. For this purpose, the Just-Pope 
production function indicates production inputs’ influence on output risk and a Holt-Laury 
lottery is used to measure the producers’ risk attitude. We test whether more risk averse 
farmers use more risk-reducing and less risk-increasing production inputs. Therefore, we 
apply a unique data set which includes 185 small-scale farmers on the island of Sumatra, 
Indonesia. The Just-Pope production function indicates that a higher fertiliser usage has a 
risk-reducing effect, whereas a higher herbicide usage and a bigger plot size have risk-
increasing effects. By including the outcome of a Holt-Laury lottery into the analysis, we 
found the expected result that more risk averse farmers use more (risk-reducing) fertiliser 
and less (risk-increasing) herbicides. These consistent results reinforces the external 
validity of measuring risk attitude with the Holt-Laury lottery. 
Keywords 
Holt-Laury lottery, Just-Pope production function, output risk, rubber, Indonesia  
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1. Introduction 
Yield fluctuations caused by extreme weather conditions, diseases or the adoption of new 
technologies have the potential to lead to dramatic changes in income, thus making farming 
a risky business (Key and MacDonald, 2006). The output risk in combination with the risk 
attitudes of farmers are among the main drivers for production decisions in agriculture 
(Chavas et al., 2010). Moreover, Hellerstein et al. (2013) discuss the importance of 
understanding the risk attitude/production decision relationship since it helps to design 
policies which can accommodate changing economic and environmental circumstances as 
well as it supports farmers to make appropriate reactions. However, the precise manner in 
which risk and risk attitude affect farmer’s production decisions is not easy to determine 
(Just, 2001; Just and Pope, 2003). 
Analysing output risk as well as risk attitude is a primary focus in the research field 
pertaining to risk in agriculture (Chavas et al., 2010). An often applied and well-accepted 
method to investigate in output risk, i.e., output variance, in agricultural production is 
developed by Just and Pope (1978; 1979). This method shows production inputs’ 
simultaneous influence on the output level and output risk in agricultural production 
systems. Several studies have applied and extended this approach for different contexts and 
purposes, thus proving its relevance (Chavas and Holt, 1996; Bar-Shira et al., 1997; 
Kumbhakar, 2001; 2002a; 2002b; Abdulkadri, 2003; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Kumbhakar and 
Tveterås, 2003; Barrett et al., 2004; Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Gardebroek et al., 2010; 
Tiedemann and Latacz-Lohmann, 2013). Concerning the risk attitude, a long proven method 
for measuring it is through experiments (Binswanger, 1980). Moreover, Holt and Laury 
(2002) developed a well-accepted method to measure the risk attitude (Anderson and 
Mellor, 2008). Ihli and Musshoff (2013) further adapted this Holt-Laury (HL) risk measure 
to be applied to people with limited formal education. By taking this adaptation into 
consideration, we can apply this method for measuring risk attitudes in rural areas of 
developing countries. 
In the literature, a discussion regarding the external validity (sometimes termed 
generalisability) of experimentally obtained results is in progress. We denote external 
validity of experimental results as “insights gained in the lab can be extrapolated to the 
world beyond” (Levitt and List, 2007: 153), thus, field behavior is defined as behavior that 
occurs outside of the laboratory. However, Levitt and List (2007) are sceptical about the 
external validity of experimentally obtained results. They argue that the lab differs 
19 
 
Chapter III: Comparing the use of risk-influencing production inputs and experimentally 
measured risk attitde 
systematically from most naturally occurring environments which yields to results that are 
not always generalisable. Conversely, Camerer (2011) argues that experimental results are 
externally valid if sufficient information is available. He states that “if many experimental 
and field data sets were combined, with sufficient variation among variables […], a ‘Lab’ 
dummy variable would not be significant” (Camerer, 2011: 6). According to Roe and Just 
(2009), in economics there is typically a trade-off between the external and internal validity 
of results, with field data on the one end and lab data on the other end of the spectrum. They 
suggest alleviating this tension by applying field or natural experiments. However, various 
approaches to the problem of external validity of experimental results can be seen in the 
literature. Certainly, more examples which directly compare experimental results and field 
behaviour would be appealing. 
Farmers’ production decisions are a good option for measuring their behaviour towards 
output risk in the field because these decisions have a crucial influence on farmers’ income 
and, thus, reflect a major risk in the lives of farmers. By comparing this field behaviour 
towards risk with an experimentally measured risk attitude, we can determine if results 
found in the experiment have external validity to the behaviour in the field. In other words, 
we test if the revealed risk attitude is consistent with the experimentally measured risk 
attitude. 
Investigations comparing field decisions towards risk and experimentally measured risk 
attitudes have already been completed. Hellerstein et al. (2013) predict farming decisions 
related to diversified operations or to having crop insurance with a lottery-choice 
mechanism that measures farmers’ risk attitude and found contradicting results between 
field and experimental decisions. Further examples where lottery choices are used to 
predict agricultural decisions which include risk are, e.g., crop diversification in Peru, where 
experimental results helped predicting field behaviour (Engle-Warnick et al., 2007); 
decisions towards coffee production in Uganda, where the stated risk attitude explained 
production decisions (Hill, 2009); or adoption habits with regards to genetically modified 
crops in the USA, where results show a small effect through risk aversion (Barham et al., 
2014). With respect to non-agricultural decisions, Anderson and Mellor (2009) found 
consistent relationships between experimentally measured risk attitudes and decisions 
regarding health and safety. It seems that currently there is no definite answer to whether 
experimentally measured risk aversion is reflected in the field behaviour, which requires 
further investigations. Furthermore, experimentally measured risk attitude and production 
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decisions towards risk, evaluated with a Just-Pope (JP) production function, have not been 
compared thus far. This is especially relevant, since influencing output risk with the input 
choice is a tool which practically every farmer can utilize. Thus, farmers can manage income 
risk, independent of the availability of other tools like insurance, production diversification 
or non-farm labour. 
On the islands of Sumatra and West Kalimantan, 72% of the Indonesian rubber output is 
produced (Arifin, 2005). Rubber is a major crop trees and together with oil palm it generate 
the majority of farmers’ income in the Jambi province on Sumatra. In this province, 52% of 
the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector and about the half of the cultivated land 
is used for rubber production, which usually is managed by small-scale farmers (Statistical 
Year Book of Estate Crops, 2012). This shows the economic relevance of rubber for the 
region. Therefore, income risk caused through output risk in rubber production is a crucial 
concern in this region. 
The objective of this paper is to determine whether farmers’ production decisions towards 
risk are consistent with the risk attitude measured in an experiment. We test this for the 
case of small-scale rubber farmers in Jambi province on Sumatra, Indonesia. To determine 
farmers’ field behaviour towards risk, a JP production function is used to estimate the 
influence of production inputs on output risk (Just and Pope, 1978; 1979). Thus, the first 
hypothesis is “H1: The amount of used production inputs has an influence on output risk”. To 
measure farmers’ risk attitude, we apply an incentivised HL lottery (Holt and Laury, 2002) 
within an extra-laboratory experiment. According to Charness et al. (2013: 93), such 
experiments “have the same spirit as laboratory experiments, but are conducted in a non-
standard manner”. These methods allow for comparing the HL risk measures with an over- 
or underuse of production inputs. Through utilization of the JP production function, we can 
answer the second hypothesis, “H2: More risk-averse farmers use more risk-reducing and less 
risk-increasing inputs”. 
The present research contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it adds to 
the discussion regarding the external validity of experimental results to field behaviour 
(Levitt and List, 2007; Roe and Just, 2009; Camerer, 2011). We are the first that compare 
production decisions evaluated with a JP production function and risk attitude measured 
with an incentivised HL lottery. Second, in the research area production is focused on 
rubber and oil palm cultivation. Therefore, output risk of rubber production can cause high 
income risks for the farmers. Moreover, it is important to know how to manage risk in 
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rubber, because this could raise its attractiveness in comparison to the less environmental 
friendly oil palm. Thus far, little is known about risk-influencing effects of production inputs 
in rubber production. However, a deeper understanding of how to influence output risk in 
rubber production is relevant for the farmers, as well as for society as a whole in the Jambi 
province. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The methodology is explained in Section 
2. Section 3 gives a description of the sample selection and the data, while Section 4 presents 
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methods 
To answer the hypotheses of this paper, we proceed as follows: In Section 2.1. we explain 
how we apply a JP production function to analyse the inputs’ influence on output risk. In 
Section 2.2., we explain how we test whether inputs over- or underuses are correlated with 
farmers’ risk attitude measured with a HL lottery and how we evaluate if more risk averse 
farmers use more risk-reducing and less risk-increasing production inputs. 
2.1. Procedure for estimating inputs’ influence on output risk 
With the JP production function (Just and Pope, 1978; 1979), we want to determine the 
production inputs’ influence on the output risk, i.e., output variance. The model used to 
determine this is: 
𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�+ 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�ℎ�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� (1) 
where 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 represents the production output from plot 𝑝𝑝 in village 𝑣𝑣. 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 represents the 
input 𝑘𝑘 of plot 𝑝𝑝 in village 𝑣𝑣. What is more, 𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� is the function which determines the 
output level, whereas the function �ℎ�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� determines the inputs’ influence on output risk, 
both influenced by the input variables 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝. Moreover, 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 is a stochastic disturbance with 
an expected value of zero, along with a positive and constant variance. 
The estimation strategy used in this study is based on Gardebroek et al. (2010). Following 
this direction, we define that 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�ℎ�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� = 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝. Thus, Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, with 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 as a residual. This modification makes the function for 
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the output level 𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� feasible. We apply a quadratic specification since this allows for 
using zero-value input observations. Thus, 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 is specified by: 










+ 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 (2) 
The village specific effects on output level, e.g., through different soil or weather conditions, 
are captured by 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝. Moreover, 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 and 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 show the inputs’ influence on output level. 𝐾𝐾 
equals the number of applied input variables. 𝛼𝛼0 is the intercept. With a translog 
specification for 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, we can estimate inputs’ influence on output variance. This translog risk 
function is given by: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� = 𝛽𝛽0 +
1













� + 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
(3) 
In Equation (3), the dependent variable 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� is derived from the logarithmic absolute 
value of the residual in Equation (2). 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 covers village-specific fixed effects of production 
risk. Moreover, since all values are taken in the natural logarithm 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, the coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 and 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 reflect the elasticities of the output variance for the specific input variable, i.e., the 
inputs’ influence on output risk. Furthermore, we have zero-value observations for some of 
the input variables; thus, 𝑀𝑀 signifies the number of correction dummies which are necessary 
to estimate unbiased coefficients for such inputs. These dummies contain a value of one for 
each zero-value observation of the respective variable (Battese, 1997). Other researchers 
have also applied such a dummy variable technique when using a JP production function (Di 
Falco and Chavas, 2009). 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 is the error term. For more in-depth 
details concerning Equation (3), please refer to the relevant literature (Just and Pope, 1978; 
1979; Gardebroek et al., 2010). 
For this analysis, we are interested in the marginal risk that is created by each input. In a 




= 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 + 2𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ln�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�
𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1≠𝑘𝑘
               𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾      (4) 
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Equation (4) shows the partial derivative of the output risk of an input 𝑘𝑘. 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘, 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 and 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 are 
coefficient from Equation (3). With Equation (4), we can calculate the risk-increasing or 
risk-reducing effect of an input for each observation. 
To prove the reliability of the JP production function, we test for monotonicity assumption 
for the function which determines the output level, i.e., Equation (2). Thus, we test whether 




= 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 + 2𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + � 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1≠𝑘𝑘
                 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾      (5) 
2.2. Procedure for estimating the influence of experimentally measured risk attitude 
on over- or underuse of inputs 
To measure farmers’ risk attitude, an HL lottery is conducted (Holt and Laury, 2002). The HL 
lottery, shown in Table 1, is comprised of ten paired lottery-choice decisions between option 
A and option B. Each option has two possible payouts for which the probabilities are 
systematically changed. Option A has a moderate payout-spread and is therefore the “safe 
choice”, whereas option B has a high payout-spread making it the “risky choice”. Ex post, one 
pair is randomly chosen and paid out to the participants. The lottery was adapted to take 
into consideration that at least some of the people in the rural areas of Sumatra have a 
limited formal education or may even be illiterate. Therefore, the experiment was designed 
by visualising probabilities with differently coloured balls instead of complicated numerical 
probabilities, which makes the experiment easily understandable (Ihli and Musshoff, 2013). 
The applied design is pictured in the appendix (Figure A1). 
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Table 1. Payoffs of the HL lottery 
Choice Option A Option B 
Difference in the 
expected payoff 
1 With 10% price of Rp 4,000 
With 90% price of Rp 3,200 
With 10% price of Rp 7,600 
With 90% price of Rp 200 
Rp  2,340 
2 With 20% price of Rp 4,000 
With 80% price of Rp 3,200 
With 20% price of Rp 7,600 
With 80% price of Rp 200 
Rp  1,680 
3 With 30% price of Rp 4,000 
With 70% price of Rp 3,200 
With 30% price of Rp 7,600 
With 70% price of Rp 200 
Rp  1,020 
4 With 40% price of Rp 4,000 
With 60% price of Rp 3,200 
With 40% price of Rp 7,600 
With 60% price of Rp 200 
Rp     360 
5 With 50% price of Rp 4,000 
With 50% price of Rp 3,200 
With 50% price of Rp 7,600 
With 50% price of Rp 200 
Rp    -300 
6 With 60% price of Rp 4,000 
With 40% price of Rp 3,200 
With 60% price of Rp 7,600 
With 40% price of Rp 200 
Rp    -960 
7 With 70% price of Rp 4,000 
With 30% price of Rp 3,200 
With 70% price of Rp 7,600 
With 30% price of Rp 200 
Rp -1,620 
8 With 80% price of Rp 4,000 
With 20% price of Rp 3,200 
With 80% price of Rp 7,600 
With 20% price of Rp 200 
Rp -2,280 
9 With 90% price of Rp 4,000 
With 10% price of Rp 3,200 
With 90% price of Rp 7,600 
With 10% price of Rp 200 
Rp -2,940 
10 With 100% price of Rp 4,000 
With 0% price of Rp 3,200 
With 100% price of Rp 7,600 
With 0% price of Rp 200 
Rp -3,600 
Notes: Rp = Indonesian rupiah. 
Table 1 shows that as the probability for higher outcomes increases in the HL lottery, the 
expected payoff difference between option A and option B decreases; beginning with the 5th 
pair of choices, the expected outcome differences become negative. Therefore, a perfect 
rational, profit maximising participant would switch from option A to option B with the 5th 
choice. For the first choices, only a strongly risk seeking participant would choose option B, 
whereas for the final choices, only a strongly risk averse participant would choose option A. 
Consistent behaviour would be established if the participant would never switch from 
option B to option A as they make decisions in the HL lottery. The number of option A 
choices, i.e., the safe choices, would then be the relevant value which indicates the risk 
attitude. Unfortunately, such consistent behaviour is not always observed in the HL lottery 
(Holt and Laury, 2002). In the literature, several methods have been established for 
managing inconsistent behaviour in the HL lottery. The first method, as discussed by Holt 
and Laury (2002), is to consider only observations with consistent behaviour for the 
analysis. The number of safe choices present among the consistent observations is then the 
respective measure; we will call this measure “HL-consistent”. This measure has the 
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disadvantage of losing the observations with inconsistent behaviour. Alternatively, Holt and 
Laury suggest using the total number of safe choices as a risk measure, independent of 
whether the choices are consistent; this measure will be called “HL-total”. Another method 
which is also discussed in the literature is to consider only the observation at the first 
switching point from option A to option B, independent of whether the choices beyond this 
point are consistent (Masclet et al., 2009); this measure will be termed “HL-change”. With all 
three of the HL-measures presented here, a higher value implies more risk averse 
behaviour. For robustness purposes we will apply all three mentioned HL-measures for this 
analysis.  
In order to assess the over- or underuse of a certain input, we deduct the perfect rational, 
profit maximising input use 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗  from the real input use 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝. To calculate the profit 
maximising input use 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗ , we have to start with the profit calculation, which is as follows: 




In Equation (6), the profit 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 is calculated by multiplying output 𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗ � with the product 
price 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and deduct the input 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗  multiplied with an input price of 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 to account for the 







𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝                𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾      (7) 
The derivation on the right side of the minus equals one. Thus, restructuring and 




𝜕𝜕�𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗ + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 �
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗
      𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾 (8) 
By derivation and restructuring of Equation (8) we finally find how to calculate the perfect 
rational, profit maximising input use 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗ . 
                                      𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗ =
𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
− 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 − ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1≠𝑘𝑘
2𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
                 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾      (9) 
By applying the coefficients of the function for the output level (Equation (2)), we can 
calculate the values for 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗  for each input and observation. The difference between the real 
input use 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and the perfect rational, profit maximising input use 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗  is shown by 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆ : 
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𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆ = 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗  (10) 
Thus, a positive or negative 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  identifies the over- or underuse of a certain input, 
respectively. With the values of 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  at hand, it is possible to test whether inputs over- or 
underuse correlates with producers’ risk-aversion 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 as follow: 
𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆ = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛾𝛾2(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)² + 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 (11) 
𝛾𝛾1 and 𝛾𝛾2 show the influence of the linear and the squared HL-measures on input’ over-or 
underuse. 𝛾𝛾0 and 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 are the intercept and the residual, respectively. For robustness 
purposes, all three discussed HL-measures for risk attitude, i.e., HL-consistent, HL-total and 
HL-change, are used as independent variables for a single variable quadratic function with 
𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  as the dependent variable. Therefore, we have three independent regressions for each 
input variable. By deriving Equation (11), we can calculate the marginal effect of the HL-
measures on input use: 
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
= 𝛾𝛾1 + 2𝛾𝛾2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 (12) 
Equation (12) determines the marginal effects of the respective HL-measure on the input 
use. Combined with the results from Section 2.1., we can demonstrate if more risk-averse 
farmers use more risk-reducing and less risk-increasing production inputs. 
3. Sample selection and data 
The data was collected in the Jambi Province on Sumatra, Indonesia. Jambi has 
approximately three million inhabitants and has an area of roughly 50,000 square 
kilometres. The research area extends over five regencies of the Jambi Province: Sarolangun, 
Tebo, Bungo, Batang Hari and Muaro Jambi. Rubber is a major tree crop in this area (Otsuka 
et al., 2000, Statistical Year Book of Estate Crops, 2012). 
The data were collected from October to December 2012 in 35 randomly chosen villages. 
With one exception, 2 villages are always located in one district, resulting in 18 different 
districts. Depending on the size of each village, between 10 and 24 randomly chosen farmers 
were invited to participate in this research. Since not all farmers accepted the invitation, and 
not all farmers cultivate rubber, the final data set consists of 185 farmers, which cultivate a 
combined total of 260 rubber plots. In the used data set, a farmer may have several rubber 
plots, however, these plots are always within one village. While the production and 
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socioeconomic data were collected a few days in advance, the experiments took place, 
depending on local conditions, in the early afternoon or after evening prayer. The 
experiments were conducted in available public spaces such as schools, gymnasiums or the 
house of the village head. Before the experiment began, participants had to sit separately 
from one another and were not allowed to speak, except with the enumerators. Each 
participant then received a questionnaire to fill-in with their experimental decision and an 
enumerator explained the instructions with the support of visual aids. In order to account 
for learning effects, the HL lottery was conducted twice. For the analysis, only the results of 
the second HL lottery were used. To avoid a consecutive execution of these HL lotteries, 
other experiments were included as an interruption. These experiments tested for, e.g., trust 
among the participants or dealt with ex ante testing of policy measures and had no direct 
connection to the HL lottery. To avoid disturbing influences from the first HL lottery or the 
other experiments on the second HL lottery, all earnings were evaluated after the decisions 
had been made. 
Most participants won between Rp 40,000 and Rp 60,000 for all experiments, which were 
then distributed in the form of a shopping voucher for a local shop. The two HL lotteries 
account for Rp 8,336 of these sums in average. Considering that the average daily wage for a 
worker is around Rp 50,000 in the research area, the amount of vouchers seem to be 
adequate compensation for these experiments. The lotteries took about half an hour, 
whereas the other experiments took around three hours. 
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Table 2. Socioeconomic, experimental and production data 
 
mean sd 
Observations rubber farmers 185  
Male, percent 83.61 
 Age, years 44.03 10.49 
Education, years 7.67 3.12 
Household size, persons 4.50 1.42 
First lottery, HL-consistent 3.85 2.95 
Second lottery, HL-consistent 3.95 2.72 
First lottery, HL-total 4.39 2.42 
Second lottery, HL-total 4.36 2.32 
First lottery, HL-change 2.46 2.58 
Second lottery, HL-change 2.64 2.56 
Observations rubber plots 260  
Yield, kga) 3,167 3,441 
Fertiliser, kga) 78.2 224.8 
Herbicides, litre 5.45 9.79 
Labour, hours/year 964 612 
Plot size, hectare 2.07 1.84 
Plantation age, years 19.30 9.14 
Notes: a) Fertiliser and herbicides have 192 and 138 zero-value observation, respectively. 
Table 2 shows the socioeconomic, experimental and production data of the relevant farmers 
and plots. For this analysis we apply five production inputs, i.e., fertiliser, herbicides, labour, 
plot size and plantation age. For fertilizer and herbicides, the high standard deviation in 
relation to mean values can be explained through the high share of zero-value observations. 
For each of the three HL measures, the differences between the first and the second lotteries 
are not significant at the 5% level. 
4. Results 
In the section 4.1, we show the estimated influence form production inputs on output risk. 
Thus, we can respond to the first hypotheses. Section 4.2 shows the correlation of the 
experimentally measured risk attitude and the input use. Together with results from 4.1, the 
second hypotheses is answered. 
4.1. Estimated inputs’ influence on output risk 
Following the estimation strategy described in Section 2.1, the JP production function starts 
with estimating inputs’ influence on output level with the quadratic production function, 
described in Equation (2). Therefore, we account for five production inputs, i.e., fertiliser, 
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herbicides, labour, plot size and plantation age. We assume that output variance is related to 
input use, which implies heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we apply White’s procedure in order 
to obtain heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (Wooldridge, 2002). The results of this 
estimation can be seen in Table A1 in the appendix. Seven out of the twenty estimated 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at a 10% level. An F-test clearly indicates 
the existence of unobserved, village constant effects. Moreover, the adjusted R-square of 
0.617 indicates a high degree of explanatory power of the estimated production function. 
For each input of this quadratic production function, we tested whether the monotonicity 
assumption is violated. Therefore, we calculated the marginal influence on output level for 
each production input (Equation (3)). In 25 of the 68 observations where fertilizer is used, 
monotonicity is violated. However, if we split those 68 observations into herbicide users and 
non-herbicide users, we find that fertiliser users which also use herbicide violate 
monotonicity at a higher level of 44.2% (23/52 observations), whereas fertilizer users that 
do not also use herbicide do this only at a reasonable level of 12.5% (2/16 observations). 
For herbicide, 47 out of 122 observations where herbicide is used violate the assumption of 
monotonicity. However, if we split these 122 observations up into fertiliser users and non-
fertiliser users, we find that 67.3% (35/52) and 17.1% (12/70) violate monotonicity, 
respectively. For the majority of the 52 plots where the use of fertilizer and herbicides is 
combined, monotonicity is violated, whereas for the other plots the monotonicity 
assumption for fertiliser and herbicide is fulfilled at a reasonable level. Through further 
investigation, we found that those 52 plots have on average 72.8 kg more yield per hectare 
and also a 2.5% higher product price. Even though these differences are not significant, 
farmers seem to have an advantage in using both of these inputs, even though the violation 
of monotonicity indicates an overuse of these inputs in many cases. However, for labour and 
plot size, we found that monotonicity was violated at a reasonable level in 3.5% (9/260) and 
10.4% (27/260) of the observations, respectively. Since we do not expect yields to increase 
with plantation age, the violation in 39.2 % (102/260) of the observations is unproblematic 
for this production input. To summarize, aside from the observations where fertiliser and 
herbicide are used simultaneously, monotonicity is fulfilled to a reasonable degree. 
Therefore, it is apparent that we have a well-specified production function. 
To estimate inputs’ influence on output risk, we apply the translog risk function shown in 
Equation (3). By including fixed effects, we account for village constant, risk influencing 
effects. In order to obtain unbiased results, we introduced three correction dummies: one 
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for fertiliser, one for herbicides and due to the significant interaction found between 
fertilizer and herbicide usage in the discussion about monotonicity, we additionally 
introduce a correction dummy for observations with non-zero values of fertilizer and 
herbicides (Battese, 1997). As demanded by the model, all variables are applied in 
logarithmic values (Just and Pope 1978; 1979). The results of this estimation can be seen in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. Elasticities of input use on output risk 
 
mean se p-value 
 Fertiliser 0.636 2.223 0.775  
Herbicides -1.073 1.759 0.542  
Labour 1.449 4.464 0.746  
Plot size 5.902 3.676 0.110  
Plantation age -0.635 6.362 0.921  
Fertiliser x Fertiliser -0.021 0.095 0.827  
Fertiliser x Herbicides -0.006 0.018 0.725  
Fertiliser x Labour -0.045 0.037 0.219  
Fertiliser x Plot size 0.037 0.032 0.247  
Fertiliser x Plantation age 0.002 0.030 0.933  
Herbicides x Herbicides 0.016 0.097 0.872  
Herbicides x Labour 0.132 0.038 0.001 *** 
Herbicides x Plot size -0.103 0.036 0.004 *** 
Herbicides x Plantation age -0.012 0.038 0.747  
Labour x Labour -0.168 0.164 0.308  
Labour x Plot size -0.052 0.268 0.846  
Labour x Plantation age 0.298 0.289 0.304  
Plot size x Plot size 0.143 0.141 0.309  
Plot size x Plantation age -0.672 0.261 0.011 ** 
Plantation age x Plantation age 0.083 0.261 0.750   
Dummy fertiliser 0.396 13.275 0.976  
Dummy herbicides -0.566 8.024 0.944  
Dummy fertiliser x Dummy herbicides 0.281 1.974 0.887  




Adjusted R-square 0.623      
Notes: Significantly different from zero at the **5% and ***1% levels. 
In Table 3, from the 20 variables which are not correction dummies, 3 are significantly 
different from zero at a 5% level. This low share of significant influences for such 
regressions can also be found in other studies, e.g., 4 out of 35 (Gardebroek et al., 2010). 
However, the high adjusted R-square of 0.623 indicates a high explanatory power of the 
output risk with the used inputs. Therefore, this regression seems to be a good basis for the 
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further analysis. An F-test indicates the existence of unobserved, village constant effects on 
the output risk. By further investigating these effects, we found that approximately 10.8% of 
the variation between villages can be explained with regency variables. Thus, the south-
western regency, Sarolangun, has the highest output risk, whereas the north-western Tebo 
and Bungo have medium output risk. The lowest output risk was found in Batang Hari, 
which is in the central region of the research area, followed by the eastern regency Muara 
Jambi. It can thus be determined that there are regional differences concerning the output 
risk. 
With respect to the first hypothesis “H1: The amount of used production inputs has an 
influence on output risk” Table 3 shows that 3 out of 20 combinations of inputs have a 
significant influence on output risk. Therefore, we can support the first hypothesis. 
To determine the inputs’ marginal influence on output risk, we apply Equation (5). For 
fertiliser and herbicides, it is reasonable to consider only observations with non-zero-
values. For the purpose of this article, we are primarily interested in the direction, and not in 
the size, of an inputs’ influence on output risk. To find such direction, we compare the 
number of risk-increasing and risk-reducing observations for each input. However, it is 
difficult to determine at which proportion of risk-increasing and risk-reducing observations 
an input’s influence on output risk is distinct. In order to determine the direction of inputs’ 
influence on output risk, we determined that it is sufficient if more than 75% of the 
observations point in the same direction. 










Fertiliser 68 0 (0%) 68 (100%) Risk-decreasing 
Herbicides 122 114 (93%) 8 (7%) Risk-increasing 
Labour 260 106 (41%) 154 (59%) Ambiguous 
Plot size 260 197 (76%) 63 (24%) Risk-increasing 
Plantation age 260 145 (56%) 115 (44%) Ambiguous 
 
Table 4 shows that for all 68 non-zero observations, the marginal effect of fertiliser usage is 
risk-decreasing. Moreover, the marginal effect of herbicide usage is risk-increasing for a 
clear majority (93%) of the non-zero-value observations. For plot size, we found a risk-
increasing effect for 76% of the observations. Therefore, we consider this production input 
to also be risk-increasing. However, for labour and plantation age the observations of risk-
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increasing and risk-decreasing marginal effects are almost equal, making the influence on 
output risk ambiguous. Thus, to go further with the analysis only fertilizer, herbicides and 
plot size are taken into consideration. 
4.2. Influence of experimentally measured risk attitude on input use 
According to Equation (10), 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  indicates an over- or underuse of an input, respectively. 
For fertiliser, we found an overuse in 40 and an underuse in 28 observations. For herbicides, 
we found an over- or underuse in 74 and 48 observations, respectively. This relatively high 
share of overuse was already established for both of these inputs during the discussion 
about the monotonicity assumption. Unfortunately, for the plot size input, we have little 
information pertaining to land prices. Therefore, a reasonable calculation of 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  is not 
possible and we have to omit this input for the further analysis. 
Table 5. Effect of HL-measures on fertiliser and herbicide over- or underuse (𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆ )a) 
 
Estimated influence of the respective 
HL-measure on over- or underuse of 
input 
(Equation (11)) 
Marginal effect of the respective HL-
measure on over- or underuse of input 
 



















mean p-value mean p-value 
𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  fertiliser 
       𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝-consistentb) c) -272.2 0.025** 24.940 0.051* 78.0% 32/41d) 22.0% 9/41d) 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝-totalb) -154.0 0.115 9.865 0.338 85.3% 58/68d) 14.7% 10/68d) 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝-changeb) -197.9 0.008*** 19.25 0.036** 55.9% 38/68d) 44.1% 30/68d) 
𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  herbicides        
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝-consistentb) c) 4.510 0.034** -0.629 0.017** 21.3% 16/75d) 78.7% 59/75d) 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝-totalb) 2.469 0.142 -0.287 0.144 21.3% 26/122d) 78.7% 96/122d) 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝-changeb) 3.484 0.021** -0.516 0.011** 36.9% 45/122d) 63.1% 77/122d) 
Note: Significantly different from zero at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. a) Estimating with fixed effects at 
the district level, as well as at the village level, results in qualitatively similar results, but in high losses of 
degrees of freedom. Moreover, estimating with the HL-measures from the first HL-lottery leads to similar 
results; b) Each line represents estimation results of one regression; c) Lost observations through inconsistency 
are 27 and 47 for fertiliser and herbicides, respectively; d) Share of observations with the respective marginal 
effect. 
Table 5 shows the influence of the HL risk measures on over- or underuse of fertiliser and 
herbicides. Therefore, the regression results from Equation (11) regarding fertiliser and 
herbicides are presented, each with results for HL-consistent, HL-total and HL-change. A 
higher HL-measure indicates a farmer having a higher aversion to risk. Moreover, the 
respective marginal effect of these HL-measures on 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  is calculated (Equation (12)). 
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Similar to Table 4, the effect is determined to be definite if more than 75% of the 
observations point in one direction. Before interpreting Table 5, it is necessary to recall that 
fertiliser was found to be risk-decreasing while herbicide was found to be risk-increasing 
(Table 4). 
For the three regressions with 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  fertiliser as the dependent variable, we found that the 
coefficients of HL-consistent and HL-change are significant different from zero at 5% or 
close to this level, which strongly indicates a relationship between these HL-measures and 
fertilizer use. For HL-total, no significant difference from zero is indicated. For HL-total and 
HL-consistent, more than 75% of the observations clearly indicate a positive marginal effect 
of these HL-measures on 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  fertiliser. Despite the ambiguous marginal effect for HL-
change, we can clearly support the statement that more risk-averse farmers (indicated by 
higher HL-measures) use more (risk-decreasing) fertiliser. Thus, for the fertiliser input we 
find consistent results for input use and experimentally measured risk-aversion. 
For 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  herbicides, we found a pattern similar to the outcome for fertilizer. Whereas the 
coefficients of HL-total are not significantly different from zero, the coefficients of HL-
consistent and HL-change are significant at 5% level. This clearly indicates a relationship 
between the latter two HL-measures and 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∆  herbicides. For HL-consistent and HL-total, a 
negative marginal effect on herbicides use for more than 75% of the observations can be 
seen. For HL-change, with a share of 63.1%, the marginal effect is ambiguous. Overall, 
results slightly indicate that more risk-averse farmers use less (risk increasing) herbicide. 
This indicates consistent results for herbicides use and experimentally measured risk-
aversion. 
With respect to the second hypothesis “H2: More risk-averse farmers use more risk-
decreasing and less risk-increasing inputs”, we find that more risk averse farmers use more 
(risk-decreasing) fertilizer and less (risk-increasing) herbicides. Consequently, we support 
hypothesis two. It seems that participants’ field behaviour towards risk and their 
experimentally measured risk attitude are consistent considering the example of using risk-
influencing production inputs. In other words, for the context of this article results indicate 
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5. Conclusions 
Production output in agriculture can vary significantly, making farming a risky business. 
Literature indicates that such output risks can be influenced by the choice of production 
inputs. However, these output risks combined with farmers’ risk attitudes, influence 
farmers’ production decisions. Having a better understanding of farmers’ risk attitude can 
help with better understanding farmers’ production decisions, especially with respect to 
output risk and, thus, in better dealing with changing circumstances. This is relevant for the 
individual farmers, as well as for the development of proper policy measures. This research 
is done for the case of rubber farmers on Sumatra, which is an important region for rubber 
production in Indonesia. The output risk of rubber is especially relevant for the research 
area, since in large parts of the area rubber is the main tree crop and therefore plays a major 
role in income generation for farmers. 
To investigate the research hypotheses, i.e., ”H1: The amount of used production inputs has 
an influence on output risk” and “H2: More risk-averse farmers use more risk-reducing and less 
risk-increasing inputs”, a JP production function was conducted to determine inputs’ 
influence on output risk. Furthermore, a HL lottery was used to experimentally measure 
farmers’ risk attitudes. We find that fertiliser is a risk-decreasing input, whereas herbicides 
and plot size are risk-increasing production inputs. For labour and plantation age, the 
influences on output risk are ambiguous. In accordance with our expectations, we found that 
more risk averse farmers use more (risk-decreasing) fertiliser and less (risk-increasing) 
herbicides. These results indicate that the use of inputs, with respect to inputs’ influence on 
output risk, and the experimentally measured risk attitude are consistent, which implies 
external validity of the experimentally measured risk attitude. 
In the literature, the relationship between field behaviour towards risk and experimentally 
measured risk attitude is unclear. Some articles show no significant or inconsistent 
correlations of field behaviour and experimentally measured risk attitude, (e.g., Anderson 
and Mellor, 2009; Hellerstein et al., 2013; Barham et al., 2014), while other articles indicate 
consistent correlations (e.g., Engle-Warnick et al., 2007; Hill, 2009). With the article at hand 
we contribute to this controversial discussion. However, this discussion demands for further 
contributions. Applying the method in this article to other crops, an evaluation of a farm as a 
whole, or to other countries could further strengthen the found results. Moreover, extending 
the method to a panel data set could account for possible changes over time which would 
further support the discussion of external validity of experimental results. Additionally, 
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Lence (2009) discuss difficulties of insufficiently estimating the risk aversion in combination 
with a JP production function. In this context, it could be interesting to compare the 
estimated with the measured risk attitude. 
The results of this article are relevant for several reasons. First, by comparing the results of 
a JP production function and risk attitude measured with an incentivised HL lottery, we add 
this example to the literature for testing the external validity of such experimental results. 
This is relevant because influencing output risk with the input choice is something that can 
be done by a vast majority of farmer. Second, we found significant influence from fertiliser 
and herbicides usage on output risk for rubber production in the research area. Moreover, 
the use of these inputs goes along with farmer risk attitude. This knowledge can help with 
managing such risks and provides important information for farmers, as well as for policy 
makers. The massive expansion of oil palm plantations in the research area causes 
considerable negative externalities (Koh and Wilcove, 2008; Laumonier et al., 2010; Wilcove 
and Koh, 2010). Since in this region rubber is the obvious alternative to oil palm, increasing 
the attractiveness of rubber by knowing how to handle output risk may lead to a conversion 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Quadratic production function in levels 
  mean sea) p-value 
Fertilizer -1.790 2.401 0.461 
Herbicides 85.609 58.363 0.152 
Labour 1.426 1.034 0.177 
Plot size 353.718 514.561 0.496 
Plantation age 114.081 74.687 0.136 
Fertilizer x Fertilizer 0.006 0.002 0.003*** 
Fertilizer x Herbicides -0.613 0.136 0.000*** 
Fertilizer x Labour -0.003 0.001 0.073* 
Fertilizer x Plot size 0.711 0.561 0.214 
Fertilizer x Plantation age 0.350 0.168 0.044** 
Herbicides x Herbicides 6.621 1.330 0.000*** 
Herbicides x Labour 0.045 0.065 0.494 
Herbicides x Plot size -39.571 22.705 0.090* 
Herbicides x Plantation age -5.764 3.506 0.109 
Labour x Labour 0.000 0.001 0.602 
Labour x Plot size -0.051 0.312 0.872 
Labour x Plantation age -0.037 0.061 0.545 
Plot size x Plot size -14.006 14.201 0.331 
Plot size x Plantation age 152.995 41.215 0.001*** 
Plantation age x Plantation age -1.157 0.983 0.248 
Constant -868.405 1066.931 0.421 
Observations 260   
Adjusted R-square 0.617   
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Figure A1. HL lottery 
Source: Authors’ illustration following Ihli and Musshoff (2013). 
 
Figure A1 continued. HL lottery 
Source: Authors’ illustration following Ihli and Musshoff (2013). 
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IV. Summary and Conclusions 
The articles of this dissertation investigate the experimental and field behaviour of small-
scale farmers in the Jambi province on the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The first paper 
experimentally compares  differently designed incentives for policy measures aimed at 
reducing fertiliser use in oil palm cultivation. This is done through the use of a business 
simulation game within a framed field experiment. The external validity of experimentally 
gained results, however, has been the topic of controversial discussions. Therefore, the 
second paper tests the external validity of experimentally gained results with almost the 
same farmers that participated in the business simulation game. This was accomplished by 
comparing the use of risk-influencing production inputs in rubber production with the 
experimentally measured risk attitude. In the following segment, we summarise each paper 
and conclude with a brief discussion and outlook for future use. 
1. Ex ante evaluation of policy measures 
The first article of this dissertation investigates the experimental ex ante evaluation of 
incentives to reduce the use of fertiliser in oil palm cultivation, which causes diverse 
negative externalities, e.g., ground water pollution, the emission of NOx or ground-level 
ozone (Keller and Matson, 1994; Sekhon, 1995; Veldkamp and Keller, 1997; Palm et al., 
2002; Veldkamp et al., 2008; Hewitt et al., 2009). These negative externalities demand 
appropriate policy measures.  
An ex ante test allows for testing policy measures at low costs. So far, most ex ante policy 
analyses apply the rational choice approach, which assumes a homo-oeconomicus-like 
behaviour. Since this assumption has recently been challenged by new insights from the 
field of experimental economics, it is necessary to take these new understandings into 
consideration (Veetil, 2011). We account for those insights by experimentally investigating 
policy measures, a method which is especially relevant for developing countries (Viceisza, 
2012). 
In this article, we test whether the design of an incentive for a policy measure influences its’ 
effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency. We do this for the example of reducing the 
fertiliser usage with small-scale farmers who cultivate oil palm or have a realistic chance of 
doing so in the future. The research area is in Jambi province, on the Indonesian island of 
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Sumatra. The three hypotheses of this article are “For the same effect on expected income, the 
H1: effectiveness, H2: sustainability, H3: efficiency of an incentive is independent of its design, 
i.e., reward or punishment, with different magnitudes and probabilities of occurrence”. 
The applied method is a business simulation game embedded in a framed field experiment. 
In this experiment, we simulated farmers operating an oil palm plantation for several 
cultivation periods. The compared incentives are differently designed, but constant in their 
effect on expected income. By testing for H1: effectiveness, we found that either certain 
punishment or uncertain reward are the most effective incentives. With respect to H2: 
sustainability, the uncertain reward turned out to be more sustainable than the certain 
punishment. Additionally, by testing for H3: efficiency, we found that a certain reward is the 
most efficient design. Thus, in order to achieve a strong and sustainable reduction in 
fertiliser, the use of an uncertain reward is the best design. Otherwise, if a policy aims to 
reduce fertiliser usage at low costs, a certain reward is the preferable design. 
Both of these suggested incentives for fertiliser reduction, however, do not account for 
considerations or costs that might be relevant for practical application. For uncertain 
reward, i.e., the most effective and sustainable design, compliant behaviour is, per definition, 
not always rewarded. This could be seen as unfair and, thus, undermine the acceptance of 
such an incentive among farmers (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Additionally, it might be 
challenging to implement a process that is completely safe against corruption . A certain 
reward, i.e., the most efficient incentive design, necessitates the monitoring of each farmer. 
Individual monitoring could provoke high and, thus, decreases the efficiency in contrast to 
uncertain incentives. 
It is unclear if these results are valid only in the aforementioned context, or if they are also 
valid in general. For example, it is possible that experimental results differ between, or even 
within, countries due to cultural differences (Herrmann et al., 2008; Balliet et al., 2011). 
Moreover, it could be that these results are specific for oil palm cultivation or for reducing 
the use of fertiliser. Furthermore, adopting the experimental layout could lead to different 
results, e.g., through the implementation of several possible production systems instead of 
one, or by adopting a more realistic generation of the output price or the production 
function. Consequently, further experiments are desirable  to determine if the obtained 
results are robust in other contexts. 
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2. Comparing the use of risk-influencing production inputs and 
experimentally measured risk attitude 
The second article of this dissertation compares the use of risk-influencing production 
inputs with the experimentally measured risk attitude. In the research pertaining to 
agriculture, analysing risk and risk attitude is a primary focus (Chavas et al., 2010). 
However, it is long known that output risk can be influenced by risk-influencing production 
inputs (Just and Pope, 1978; 1979). It is vital for policy makers, as well as farmers to 
understand the influence of inputs on output risk, since it can help to manage such risks. 
However, in the case of rubber production, little is known about the influences of production 
inputs on output risk, further demanding investigation. 
The external validity of experimentally obtained results towards field behaviour is 
controversially discussed in the literature. In this context, Levitt and List (2007) are 
sceptical about the external validity of such results, primarily due to the systematic 
differences between the lab and the field. On the contrary, Camerer (2011) argues that 
experimentally gained results have external validity, provided sufficient information is 
available. Thus, this controversial discussion surrounding the external validity of 
experimentally gained results demands further contribution. 
In this article, a JP production function indicates inputs’ influence on output risk, whereas an 
HL lottery measures farmers’ risk attitude experimentally. Thus, we analyse the influence of 
inputs on output risk, as well as test the external validity of experimentally measured risk 
attitude. We do this for the case of small-scale rubber farmers in the Jambi province on the 
Indonesian island of Sumatra. The tested hypotheses are ”H1: The amount of used production 
inputs has an influence on output risk” and “H2: More risk-averse farmers use more risk-
reducing and less risk-increasing inputs”. 
We found that fertiliser is a risk-decreasing input, whereas herbicides and plot size are risk-
increasing production inputs. Therefore, we support the first hypothesis since these three 
production inputs have a significant influence on output risk. Moreover, we found that more risk 
averse farmers use more (risk-decreasing) fertiliser and less (risk-increasing) herbicides. Thus, we 
also support the second hypothesis. This indicates that for the use of fertiliser and herbicides, 
external validity was found for the experimentally measured risk attitude. 
These results are relevant for several reasons. First, by comparing the use of risk-influencing 
production inputs and the experimentally measured risk attitude, we contribute to the 
44 
 
Chapter IV: Summary and Conclusions 
 
ongoing discussion regarding the external validity of experimental results. This example is 
especially relevant, since influencing output risk with input use is a toll that is available for 
the vast majority of farmers. Second, we found evidence that in rubber production, output 
risk can be influenced by input use. This knowledge pertaining to methods for handling such 
output risks can be useful for developing appropriate policy measures, as well as being 
beneficial for farmers. 
3. Outlook 
For experiments like in the first article of this dissertation, the external validity is important, 
since it determines if results are valid for practical application (Levitt and List, 2007; Roe 
and Just, 2009; Camerer, 2011). Therefore, further investigation into the external validity of 
experimental results, e.g., by comparing experimental and field behaviour, would further 
show if results for the experiment are applicable to field behaviour. For example, it would be 
desirable to find a situation where a policy measure has been introduced, and then 
comparing the observed reaction towards a policy measure with the reaction from an ex 
ante experiment concerning the same measure. Fortunately, for the second phase of the CRC 
990, such an experiment for testing the “Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil” (RSPO) or 
“Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil” (ISPO)-certificates is already in the planning process.  
The second article of this dissertation provides proof for the external validity of 
experimentally measured risk attitude. However, the differences in the experimental design 
to the first article of this dissertation does not allow to assume external validity per se, even 
though the research was conducted with nearly the same farmers that took part in the 
business simulation game. Therefore, it would be appealing to further verify the obtained 
results through additional investigation. Lence (2009) discusses the difficulties with 
estimating risk aversion in combination with the JP production function. In this regard, 
further research which compares the estimated with the experimentally measured risk 
attitude is already in the planning process within the CRC 990. This further research may 
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